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Rozdział 4
Pragmatics

1. The definition and scope of pragmatics.
2. Key topics in pragmatics.
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1. The definition and scope of pragmatics: a macro and a micro perspective

Pragmatics came to be known as an independent discipline in the 20th century and is typically defined as a study of meaning in context. It is distinguished from semantics (also a study of meaning) through its focus on contextual issues. One of the early definitions of pragmatics is given by Charles Morris (1938), a semiotician, who divided all investigation focussing on meaningful signs into: a) syntax (originally labelled as "syntactics"): a study of the relation between signs; b) semantics: a study of the relation between signs and their referents; and 3) pragmatics: a study of the relation between signs and their interpreters. Thus, pragmatics focuses on **utterances** rather than **sentences** (being abstract linguistic units defined in a grammar system); it is interested in how utterances, i.e. actual linguistic acts, function in the world, how they are understood, and what consequences they may produce.

For instance a sentence:

(1) It is late.

can be semantically understood as an opinion about time, but its uttering in a context may give rise to varied interpretations. When uttered at a party it may be understood as an invitation to stay or to leave, depending on the situation. In a similar manner, responding to an offer of a cup of coffee with:

(2) Coffee would keep me awake.

can pragmatically mean acceptance: "Yes, please" or rejection: "No, thank you.", depending on the context.

Today's pragmatics concentrates on **speakers** and **hearers** (senders and receivers of messages) and the reasoning that meaningful communication involves. Interestingly, there may be a significant discrepancy between (semantic) **sentence meaning** and (pragmatic) **speaker meaning**, as for instance when the speaker is being sarcastic or ironical (cf. the meaning of "You are a real friend" uttered either literally or sarcastically as a reproach).

In processing meaning in live interaction people rely on more than simply dictionary meaning of words. They will naturally take into account "invisible" elements of context such as their knowledge of the world, expected scenarios, assumptions related to what is natural and normal, assumptions and expectations concerning what would be judged as standard, and what as strange, assumptions about gender roles, professional patterns of behaviour, etc. All these relate to different types of **context**, not only linguistic context in the sense of co-text (the language all around), but also physical and social context, e.g. related to time or location, as well as the social relationship and the social distance between interlocutors, etc. In pragmatics context is naturally seen as more than just a collection of referential pieces of information or facts. It is usually approached as a dynamic and actional background against which utterances make sense in particular circumstances. Participants in a discourse situation will naturally construct and construe the relevant context in an online mode.

It is noteworthy that at present there are two main approaches to pragmatics; a narrow definition of pragmatics is close to "pragmatism" and sees it as a study of linguistic means that people apply to get what they want. In other words pragmatics is then understood as an effective use of language. In the other perspective, a more interesting one, pragmatics covers all aspects of meaning effected by contextual intervention and embraces cognitive **inferential processes** (i.e. mental processes, guesswork) on the part of the speaker and the addressee(s), even where they are not part of the speaker's agenda. While the narrower view tends to see pragmatics as purely sociologistic and foregrounds persuasion, the wider view is more psychologistic, invites multiple cognitive perspectives and focuses on general context intervention.

Pragmatics can be distinguished from **metapragmatics** (cf. e.g. Mey 2001: 175 ff.), where the former analyses the use of language in social contexts, while the latter concentrates on the methodologies, and the metalanguage, used in pragmatics-oriented theorising.

2. Key topics in pragmatics

Pragmatics can be divided into a number of sub-areas which have developed into relatively independent fields over the years. The key pragmatic topics include: speech acts, conversational implicature, presupposition, deixis, politeness, and conversational analysis.

2.1. Speech Acts

Speech act theory is central to pragmatics as it looks at language in a functional perspective in which linguistic utterances are seen as actions with a function. It is natural that while using language people do different things: they promise, announce, invite, deny, appoint, order, etc. It is also natural that people who belong in the same culture can recognise what kind of act a speaker is performing, even though speech acts can be performed explicitly or implicitly, directly or indirectly.

The Anglo-American world recognises John L. Austin as the father of speech act theory. Austin (1962/1975) suggested a number of metalinguistic labels, which were to facilitate pragmatic analysis of natural language, and pointed out that most of natural linguistic utterances are not descriptive in nature, but rather actional so it should be irrelevant to judge them in terms of truth and falsity. This perspective may seem obvious nowadays, but was quite revolutionary in mid-20th century when doing linguistics mainly meant judgement of grammaticality and judgment of truth. J.L. Austin was the person to foreground the social, performative function of language.

According to Austin, it is practical to look at speech acts in three different perspectives recognising their internal architecture, i.e. three internal acts: 1) **locution**; 2) **illocution**; and 3) **perlocution**. Roughly, locution corresponds to the form of the utterance, which embraces its phonetic form and semantic (dictionary-like) meaning, illocution can be identified with its function in the social world, i.e. how it is to be taken in a particular context.

Finally, perlocution corresponds to the effects and consequences that the utterance produces, arching its uptake (i.e. the reception and the understanding of the utterance) with extralinguistic consequences such as physical actions stemming from the utterance. For instance, an utterance:

(3) "I'll do it first time in the morning".

whose locutionary content embraces the meaning of the words of which it is composed and the grammar form, is on the illocutionary level understood as a promise, and in a perlocutionary perspective can be used to reassure someone and possibly influence the addressee changing his or her cognitive state, including emotional aspects, i.e., e.g., make him or her happy, or sad, satisfied or prone to act in a way somehow related to the utterance. It is quite common that speech acts are identified with illocutionary acts, as utterances are naturally interpreted as social moves.

There are **direct** and **indirect speech acts**. Direct speech acts show agreement between their function and their grammatical form. In other words the real function of a direct speech act is identical with the conventional function of its grammar form. For instance,

(4) Can you swim?

is used as a question and has the interrogative structure, whose conventional function is that of questioning, but (4):

(5) Can you pass me the salt?

as used at a table is indirect as it uses the interrogative grammar form to issue a request (and not a real question). In this context answering "Yes" without passing the salt is not appropriate; the action is needed and the real function (that of a request) can often be marked with the adverb "please" added to the interrogative form, as in fact the function is that of a directive.

Austin (1962/1975) emphasised that speech acts are naturally masquerades; most of them appear to be descriptive of the world, while in reality they shape and change the world by naming the change that is being introduced by them. Interestingly, Austin's first speech act-theoretic reflections presented in Oxford went hand in hand with a legal reflection and for some time Austin even co-lectured with a famous legal theorist H.L.A. Hart (cf. Witczak-Plisiecka 2013a; 2013b and the references within). Austin used legal examples of the kind:

(6) I sentence you to five years in prison.

or:

(7) How do you plead?

(8) I plead not guilty.

to illustrate how linguistic utterances mark and introduce extralinguistic changes in the world. H.L.A. Hart, in turn, emphasised the way in which language can be operative in the realm of law. Thus, from the very beginning of speech act theory, it has been shown as relevant for analysis of languages for special purposes, with legal language in focus.

Over the years, many researchers have proposed numerous classifications of speech acts. The best known typology was created by John Searle who started his career as Austin's student. Searle (1975) based his classification on **the direction of fit**, i.e. the relation between the (real) world and the utterer's words, and suggested five main categories:

1. Directives.
2. Commissives.
3. Representatives (or Assertives).
4. Expressives.
5. Declaratives.

Directive acts, for instance orders or requests, literally "direct" other people's behaviour telling people what to do or asking them to do something. Commissive acts, e.g. promises, threats, guarantees, "commit" the speaker to some kind of future action. In both cases the direction of fit is that the world needs to adjust to agree with the words, but for directives the addressee is to perform relevant action, and for commissives it is the speaker who is bound to act. Assertive acts state facts about the world, represent how the world is, as in, e.g. descriptions of reality so the words agree with the pre-existing reality. Expressive acts, e.g. thanking, apologising, represent the speaker's inner states. Finally, Declaratives are central for the theory of social action and in terms of the direction of fit simultaneously name the change that they produce in the world (there is double direction of fit: 'words to world' and 'world to words'). They embrace acts such as appointing, giving a verdict, opening or closing a meeting, naming, etc. Declaratives are usually true masquerades as they "look" descriptive, but are quite actional in reality.

Speech acts are not true or false, but they are "successful" or not successful. Austin chose to use the Latin word "felicity" to describe this aspect,

and thus we can talk about **felicity conditions**, which will render a particular act "felicitous" or "infelicitous", if failed. For instance, for a successful promise one of the conditions will be to "promise" something good for the addressee, while in order to successfully open a meeting, or declare a war, a person needs to be the one authorised to do it.

Felicity conditions can be seen of prime importance in some context, which was demonstrated when it was announced that Barack Obama repeated his presidential oath after he had stumbled on a phrase rendering it non-perfect in 2009.

We can speak of speech acts and speech act verbs, the latter being lexical items which can name acts, or be explicitly used in performative utterances, in the first person singular, present tense, with the additional use of the adverb "hereby", meaning "by this" and "now", as in (9) below:

(9) I hereby announce you man and wife.

Some verbs, even if they serve as good labels for speech acts (e.g. "bribe", "lie") are never used in such a way because anti-social acts are never explicit in civilised societies. In fact trying to say:

(10) I hereby offend you.

would ruin the act of offending, as would be the case with bribing, threatening, etc.

There is a rich body of research on speech acts in an anthropological and intercultural perspective, including specialised languages, the link across the domains being that different cultures, including professional cultures and discourses, produce their own conventions, sometimes quite hermetic collections of pairings of form and function. There are also different expectations concerning the level of explicitness of speakers' speech acts, and constraints related to power relations, etc. For instance, in the context of police interrogation, officers are authorised to define the structure of the "conversation", while members of the public are expected to give explicit and transparent answers and accounts. In ritualised contexts, e.g. that of religious ceremonies, the utterances "allowed" can be even more dramatically constrained and predefined. Considering, for instance, legal discourse and language at large, it can be noticed that linguistic utterances can be treated differently, as many passages of legal discourse will involve the legal social structure and legal institutions, and as such, are interpreted in a more constrained way by the "insiders" of the legal culture.

Among the many developments in speech act-theoretical research, there is Jacob Mey's (e.g. 2001) proposal that speech acts are the matter discussed on a micro-pragmatic level, while in a wider macro-pragmatic perspective there are **pragmatic acts** that can be identified with speech actions. Pragmatic acts are functional "games" that people play (e.g. that of promising, apologising, etc.) and can be realised on a micro-level with the use of different patterns of behaviour, some of which are linguistic, while others do not include acts of speech. Mey emphasises the importance of **situatedness** of speech acts whose interpretation can often be less the matter of the exact words used, and more the matter of context in which the words are "situated".

2.2. Conversational Implicature

The word "implicature" was coined by Paul Grice, who wanted to mark the special nature of the phenomenon he analysed–meaning beyond words which arises in context, i.e. something not "said", but "implicated" (not to say "implied", which could suggest a formal logical connection).

Firstly, Grice distinguished two types of meaning: **natural meaning** and **non-natural meaning** (i.e. **meaning-nn** that can be identified with what the speaker means) and it is the latter that is of prime interest for the theory.

Let us consider a sample of discourse; on the surface there is no connection between utterances such as (1) and (2) below.

(11) Would you like a piece of cake?

(12) I'm on a diet.

However, in conversation people will naturally interpret (2) as "No". In pragmatic terms, "No" is implicated meaning, it is implicature which arises in context, it is meaning beyond words, in Gricean terminology, something not "said" and explicated, but "implicated".

It was not until Grice that such interpretations were shown to be systematic and accountable. In his attempt to save suggested meaning for logic and linguistic analysis, Grice created an outstanding theoretical model. Firstly, Grice (1975) suggested that people behave as if there was a general rule, which he called the **Cooperative Principle** (**CP**):

(13) Make your contribution such as is required, at the stage at which it occurs, by the accepted purpose or direction of the talk exchange in which you are engaged.

Secondly, Grice suggested **four groups of maxims** which people seem to recognise (but not necessarily follow) when they communicate:

(14) (a) **The maxim of Quality**: Try to make your contribution one that is true, i.e.:

– do not say what you believe to be false,
– do not say that for which you lack adequate evidence;

  (b) **The maxim of Quantity**:

– make your contribution as informative as is required (for the current purposes of the exchange),
– do not make your contribution more informative than is required;

  (c) **The maxim of Relevance** (at first dubbed: Relation): make your contribution relevant;

  (d) **The maxim of Manner**:

– avoid obscurity,
– avoid ambiguity,
– be brief,
– be orderly.

It is important to see that Gricean maxims are not directive in nature; they are descriptive and designed to help understand the structure of human communication, and how human cognition works while interpreting linguistic utterances. It is also important to see that although conversational logic is different from mathematical logic, conversation is also systematic in its own way.

According to Grice, "I'm on a diet" can be interpreted as "no" with reference to the CP and the maxims. The hearer would calculate the meaning first seeing the superficial lack of connection between the two utterances, then recognising that there should be a connection because people naturally respect the CP, and finally finding relevant interpretation with the use of the world knowledge, e.g. remembering the scenario that people who want to lose weight avoid sugary food.

Let us consider the following exchange related to the maxim of quantity:

(15) A: Have you got cats?

B: I've got three.

In natural conversation the utterance will be interpreted as "three and not more", which would not be the case in the language of mathematical logic, where stating that someone has three cats will contradict the fact that

they may have more (for instance whoever has five, they also at the same time have four, three, two, and one). However, the logic of conversation (also systematic!) does suggest that (conversationally) stating a value on a scale will always cancel all higher values. In the same way, saying:

(16) Martha drank some of the beer.

will suggest "not all" (cancelling all values higher on the scale than "some", i.e. cancelling: "most" and "all"). Similarly, saying:

(17) Many of the senators opposed the new regulation.

implicates that there were others who did not oppose, but logically there is no contradiction in saying:

(18) Many of the senators opposed the new regulation, in fact all of them did.

which shows that our understanding is logical not in a technical mathematical, but "conversational" way.

Grice demonstrated that natural language, especially conversational style, is logical in its own way. When people abide by the maxims they produce explicit utterances, but the most interesting application of Gricean framework is when people decide to openly flout the maxims, i.e. they do not abide by them, but do not hide it from their interlocutors. Hiding would mean being uncooperative (violation of the CP), i.e. cheating the other. When people flout the maxims they produce implicatures which can be, according to Gricean pragmatics, interpreted exactly thanks to the maxims. For instance irony or sarcasm arises when the maxim of relevance is flouted (openly not followed), in which case the Speaker's words have meaning which is opposite to his or her actual message (e.g. "You are a real friend!" said as a reproach).

There is evidence for the "existence" and significance of the maxims in adverbial phrases (so-called **hedges**) present in languages through which speakers may **opt out**, making themselves more secure with regard to the quality, quantity, relevance, or the clarity of their linguistic contributions. For instance, using the hedges: "As far as I know…", "I'm not sure if this is true, but…", "I may be wrong there , but…", speakers "refer" to the maxim of quality, using "As you probably already know…" they refer to the maxim of quantity, and saying "Oh, by the way, …" they as if point to the maxim of relevance.

Implicature is cancellable, non-detachable, calculable and reinforceable, i.e. the speaker may always deny that implicated meaning is was he or she

meant, but such meaning is quite universally understood by the hearers, and on the other hand, it can be easily reinforced by the speaker should s/he choose to do so. Scalar implicature is a good example of a **generalised conversational implicature** (**GCI**), which will arise in all contexts of use, while other examples (e.g. relevance-oriented) can be classified as **particularised conversational implicatures** (**PCIs**), as for instance "I'm not on a diet" will not always be interpreted as "I don't want the cake". Grice also referred to **conventional** implicature, which in contrast to conversational implicature is quite independent of context and can be introduced by lexical items such as: "but", "even", "therefore", "yet", etc., where, e.g. "but" always introduces contrast.

Implicature is widely used in persuasive discourse and political discourse where people may want to suggest rather than say things. Implicature is meaning beyond words and as such the speaker who produces it "beyond" his or her utterance(s) can remain "safe" in a formal way as they never "said" what is attributed to them and cannot, for instance, be taken to court for the meaning suggested as the message was not technically "said", as can be illustrated in the imaginary exchange below:

(19) A: Is the president wise and active?

B: He is active.

which gives rise that the speaker's doubts, or simply contradicts the former quality (implicature related to the maxim of quantity arising when a value is not asserted).

It is noteworthy that Grice's theory has given rise to numerous other models which are today recognised as neo-Gricean (modifications of the original framework, cf. e.g. Horn 1984) or post-Gricean (rejection of the original, but related to it, cf. **relevance theory** introduced by Sperber and Wilson 1986/1995).

Kent Bach (1994) suggested another category, named **impliciture**, related to unexpounded constituents in an utterance (e.g. "I haven't had breakfast" which is normally saturated with "today"). All such theories recognise the importance of the ostensive aspects of communication that Grice emphasised in his study of communication, i.e. that linguistic utterances are produced to pass content, but at the same time carry information that they are intentional and meant to be noticed and interpreted.

2.3. Presupposition

Linguistic presupposition is another type of suggested meaning, usually received as background information.

In a classic example:

(20) Why did you stop beating your wife?

it is presupposed that the addressee has beaten his wife in the past. As the example demonstrates, presupposition is information given as "background", as if it was part of **shared knowledge**, or **common ground**, something that is, and can be, taken for granted. Similarly, when a speaker says:

(21) We need to stop them damaging our country.

it is being presupposed that "they" have been causing damage.

Presupposition is something natural in language, but it can be used and abused as a rhetorical device, for instance in persuasive and political discourse, where it is more practical to "invisibly" suggest rather than "say". In such contexts presupposition makes it possible to present something as background information, i.e. part of reality, even if it is not factual.

There are different types of presupposition discussed in literature and research programmes. One general type is **existential presupposition**, which arises in contexts when something is mentioned. For instance, the utterance:

(22) Your sister is beautiful.

presupposes that the addressee has a sister. Other presuppositions are "switched on" by **presupposition triggers**. Such triggers include, *inter alia*, verbs of change (as "stop" in examples (20) and (21)), adverbials, structural elements (e.g. cleft and pseudo-cleft structures). What they all have in common is that the suggested meaning, i.e. the presupposition, will **stay constant under negation**. For example both (5) and its negation:

(23) Why didn't you stop beating your wife?

presuppose that the action happened in the past. Being constant under negation is a feature that distinguishes presupposition from other types of **suggested meaning** (what is communicated without explicit saying), such as implicature or entailment.

Like implicatures, presuppositions are widely used in persuasive discourse where what is presupposed is positioned as obvious and known, and not the main piece of information that the speaker is concentrated on.

2.4. Deixis

Deictic expressions are indexicals; they "point" to people, places, time, or metaphorical "locations" in discourse, as their label – the Greek term "deixis" meaning "to point, indicate" – suggests. Deictic expressions can be understood out of context only in very general **sense** (i.e. meaning). Items such as "he", "yesterday", "over there" can be understood in the sense of dictionary meaning, but their **reference** (i.e. what the expression "identifies"; what is the object to which it "refers") in each case can only be grasped when the context of their use is accessible. In this way deixis provides a link between semantics and pragmatics. We can imagine a letter found in a bottle in the sea which reads:

(24) Meet me at that place in two weeks' time.

We can understand what the sentence means, but we are not able to "point" who is going to meet whom, where and when exactly unless we can access the context, i.e. we can identify the sender of the message, the time when it was written, and the place which both the sender of the message and his or her addressee knew as "that place".

Person (or **personal**) **deixis** includes items such as: *I, he, she, we, you, they, me, him, her, us, them, that girl, that person, this man*, etc.

Time (or **temporal**) **deixis** includes: *now, then, tomorrow, yesterday, the day after tomorrow, in a week, in three weeks' time, earlier, later*, etc.

Place (or **spacial**) **deixis** includes: *here, there, near, near here, over there*, etc.

On a more metaphorical plane, we can consider deicitic expressions referring to "place" in discourse, as when we say "in the next chapter", "earlier in the book", "in what follows". Such **discourse deixis** can play an important role and be characteristic of particular discourses, which can be illustrated with the language of the law, which (at least in its traditional version) abounds in deicitic expressions and rates high on a self-referentiality scale.

2.5. Conversational analysis

Although speech act theory looks at linguistic utterances as situated in context, it is usually a different label that we use to refer to analyses done on larger stretches of linguistic data, such as conversation or discourse (e.g. academic discourse, legal discourse, medical discourse, etc.). Over the years

conversational analysis (**CA**) has grown to form a consistent field of study. Its roots are partly independent of pragmatics and come from ethnomethodology as practiced in sociolinguistics by CA pioneers such as at first Erving Goffman and Harold Garfinkel, and then Harvey Sacks, Emanuel Schegloff and Gail Jefferson.

Here is a definition of conversation given by Levinson:

> Conversation may be taken to be that familiar predominant kind of talk in which two or more participants freely alternate in speaking, which generally occurs outside specific institutional settings like religious services, law courts, classrooms and the like (Levinson 1983: 284).

The participants in a conversation take '**turns**,' and during their turns each makes a conversational '**move**' of some kind. Conversation analysts adopt the view that when people conduct a conversation it is an **interactionally managed** and **locally managed** phenomenon. In other words, people organize the construction of a conversation *together*, *cooperatively*, and they deal with the organization at a "local" level, producing *one utterance at a time*.

Exchanging utterances typically means producing actional units, people "do" something, not just "say", i.e. using the terminology introduced above, they produce speech acts, but in CA the focus is on the integrated, concerted use of such acts as a part of a larger event, a speech **action**.

The key issues discussed in CA concern the **local organization** of a conversation, **floor management**, the role of ethnographic information in analysis of conversational data; they also pertain to issues related to 'critical' discourse analysis (i.e. considerations of power relations). The sociolinguistic tradition focused on **interaction** perceived as a type of an **orderly social organization**. In Goffman's perspective the "interaction order" is seen as a form of a social institution with a complex structure, created and reinforced by the moral choices of the interacting individuals; the focus is on the quantitative value. The 'shared methods of practical reasoning' practiced in the activity are Garfinkelian ethno-methods that participants use to make sense of the interaction, i.e. to produce, reproduce, and recognize the interaction order.

In short, CA is a field of study concerned with the **norms**, **practices** and **competences underlying the organization of social interaction**, which

give insight into how people "conduct the ordinary, and perhaps the extraordinary, affairs of [… their] lives" (Drew, Heritage 2016: ii). It is also believed that human relationships with one another, the sense of who we are, our identity, is not only present, but generated, manifested, maintained and managed through our linguistic performance in conversation. In interaction, by warning, promising, apologising, etc., we are "doing" things, perform social acts which exert influence on the social world we live in. Thus, CA pays attention to speech acts, but concentrates on their interplay and on how they constitute the texture of social events, and social action.

Conversational analysis proper started with Harvey Sacks' analyses of telephone calls in Suicide Prevention Centre, and were followed with pioneering research done by Emanuel Schegloff and Gail Jefferson which involved analyses of recorded conversations and led to the discovery of orderliness in everyday interaction and the primordial status of conversation as a form of social action. This discovery is of prime importance for any analysis of social institutions and social life, and civilization in general.

In the sociolinguistic pioneering research focused on conversation the primordial character of conversation is emphasised. Conversation is seen as a distinctive form of human behaviour, and a building block of society, which is created and managed through communication, and in its most basic form by conversation between physically co-present interlocutors. Conversation is thus a form of social organization which allows for management (and earlier creation) of institutions of social life such as the family, the polity, or the party. Schegloff (1996: 4) dubbed conversation (talk-in-interaction) a sociological bedrock.

CA has a rich potential for analysis of institutional interactions in different contexts and on two main planes: 1) the analysis of social institutions **of interaction** (i.e. what they are); and 2) the analysis of the management of social institutions **in interaction** (i.e. how they are managed). Among the potential research areas there are: patient-doctor interaction, courtroom interaction, police interrogation, academic contexts (e.g. class interaction), mass-media contexts, political discourse (e.g. political debates), "monologic" interactions (lecturing, speech-making), web-based multiparty communication. This variety invites an interdisciplinary per-

spective, where the research focus can be of linguistic, sociological, psychological, political, critical, etc. nature.

Naturally, there is much variety in CA research, but there is also a basic belief that the interaction in each of the contexts as listed above will exhibit systematic characteristics. The CA methodology focuses on showing how conversation is **locally managed** (and that it **is** locally managed). Unitary speech acts are presented in chunks as "speech exchange systems", i.e. shared and structured practices for meaning-making and meaning-interpreting. While speech act theory has the tendency to focus on solitary acts, here interaction is approached as **an activity negotiated between the participants**. The analysis involves the recognition of **turn-taking** organization.

Turn-taking presupposes that a conversation is not totally random and not totally preplanned. Instead it is managed by speakers who typically speak one at a time with smooth transitions between speaker turns, which happen with little or no gap or overlap. In this context we speak of **turn construction** and **turn allocation**. There may be different **turn-constructional units** (**TCUs**), which could be single or multiple. The main four TCUs identified for English are: lexical, phrasal, clausal, and sentential. There are also grammatical and intonational features indicating turn-taking structure, i.e. turn-taking can be marked either through using a specific grammatical structure, or a pattern of intonation.

The location where interlocutors feel they can take turn is called **transition relevant place** (**TRP**). **Turn design** reveals the local pragmatic contribution to the overall conversation seen as an action. For instance in one of the pioneering studies Deborah Tannen presented **conversational overlap** as a feature of New York conversational style. In CA we also discuss **sequence organization**, **preference organization**, **repairs**, and **asymmetries**.

The sequence organization concentrates on the so-called **adjacency pairs**, which have the form of a sequence of two utterances which are: 1) adjacent; 2) produced by different speakers; 3) ordered as a first pair part and a second pair part, and 4) type-related, so that a particular first pair part requires a particular second pair part (or sometimes a range of second parts). Table 1 below presents frequent adjacency pairs.

Table 1. Preferred and Dispreferred Second Parts to various First Parts

SECOND PARTS:	FIRST PARTS:				
	Request	**Offer/Invite**	**Assessment**	**Question**	**Blame**
Preferred:	acceptance	acceptance	agreement	expected answer	denial
Dispreferred:	refusal	refusal	disagreement	unexpected answer or non-answer	admission

Source: adapted from Levinson (1983: 336).

The table presents adjacency pairs with two different versions of the second part: the preferred and the dispreferred. The **preference organization** is descriptive of the normative, accountable and intersubjective aspect in conversation. For instance, greeting is naturally paired with a return greeting; a question with an answer; a request with a response, but the response is either an acceptance or a rejection. An acceptance is a "preferred" response, but "theoretical" preference in CA analysis reflects which second part is usually expected and realised. In a similar manner, a question will most often be paired with an answer (the preferred, i.e. the more frequent second part).

Dispreffered responses usually require explanations (which fact emphasises the social aspect of a conversation); the labels of "preferred" and "dispreffered" are not to be descriptive of some psychological reality; they are structural, refer to a structural relationship of sequence parts (cf. Schegloff 2007: 61).

Conversation often includes elements identified as **repairs** in interaction, which could take the form of either **self-repair** or **other-initiated repair**. These could be for example passages referring to problems in speaking, hearing and understanding, which are again organized in pairs: 1) repair initiation and 2) a repair outcome (i.e. a solution or abandonment of the problem).

Finally, epistemological **asymmetries** in conversation refer to the managing of asymmetries in knowledge present between interlocutors.

It is foregrounded that in a conversation there are linear and other **chains** (cf. Wardhaugh, Fuller 2015: 283 ff.). The pairing relationship provides the possibilities of both continuity and exchange, and also for a complex system of semantic interrelations. The chaining effect can be produced when a question

leads to an answer, the answer to a comment, the comment to an acknowledgment or a contradiction, etc. It may happen that an adjacency pair in a chain is "broken" with, e.g., an embedded pair, as in the example below:

(25) A: Would you like to go out tonight?
      B: Would you?
      A: That'd be nice.
      B: Let's go then.

In the mini-conversation above there are two adjacency pairs, both including a question and an answer, but the question in the first line has its second part in the fourth line, while the second and the third line form an insertion, an embedded adjacency pair.

Utterances can also function as **pre-sequences**, when they are to introduce further discourse by attracting attention or setting the ground (e.g. "Are you free tonight?").

Other types of exchanges, e.g. a formal speech, are different in nature (e.g. pre-planned or ghost-written in advance, usually engaging only one speaker (sometimes some feedback, e.g. cheers, etc.). Non-conversations can also be analysed using CA (e.g. political speeches; cf. discussion of Aristotle's triangle), but their structures are (at least to a certain degree) parasitic on the 'normal', typical conversation as defined above.

Pre-defined pseudo-conversational interactions, such as for instance classroom teacher-pupils interaction, can be analysed with the use of the **IRF model** (cf. Cutting 2008). The IRF model focuses on three categories: 1) initiation, 2) response, and 3) feedback. The model suggests the identification of a three-part exchange as a basic unit in conversational organization.

To reiterate, what CA analysts are focusing on is the identification and description of the expectations, procedures, forms that interlocutors use and experience while engaging in a conversation. CA also analyses interactional problems and their management. It is a functional approach, which aims to elucidate how things are done conversationally, which elements of conversation are conventional (thus taken as "normal"), and how departure from the expected is managed (e.g. by repairs).

In order to analyse a conversation, researchers produce transcriptions of the interaction in question and use a number of conventionalised markers to indicate selected features. Table 2 presents a selection of transcription conventions according to Gumperz and Berenz (1993).

Table 2. Transcription conventions

Transcription conventions	
=	overlapping speech
==	latching
(.) (..) (…)	pauses of different length
::	lengthened segments
?	rising or question intonation
–	word or utterance cut-off
CAPS	markedly louder
[ ]	non-lexical phenomena, both vocal and non-vocal
{[ ] text}	non-lexical phenomena, both vocal and non-vocal, that overlay the lexical stretch
( )	unintelligible speech
(text)	a good guess at an unclear word
text	additional information
→	special attention should be paid to these utterances
[laugh], [giggle]	a laughter type
[hehe], [haha]	audible separate laughter particles

Source: according to Gumperz, Berenz (1993).

2.6. Politeness

Politeness theory is a model whose aim is to explain the strategies that people apply in communication. It builds on Erving Goffman's sociolinguistic considerations of the notion of "**face**", i.e. the positive social value that a person claims for her- or himself. Face has its "positive" and "negative" aspects, which correspond to a natural human need to be independent ("**negative face**") and a need to be part of society ("**positive face**"). It is suggested that all speech acts are potentially dangerous, in other words they are (at least potentially) **face-threatening acts** (FTAs). People can also produce **face-saving acts** when their utterance is meant to reduce the threat to the face. Face threatening acts involve imposition, while face-saving acts draw on solidarity (by lessening the imposition and indicating ground for the addressee's independence).

Figure 1 presents a classic model of politeness strategies as defined by Penelope Brown and Stephen Levinson in the 1970s and 1980s.

Figure 1. Strategies for doing FTAs

Source: according to Brown, Levinson (1987: 69).

The diagram represents the discursive choices that interlocutors may apply in interaction. Firstly, there is a choice between producing an FTA, or remaining silent, then a choice between going on record (producing an explicit utterance), or going off record (suggesting, implicating). Finally, going on record can be realised directly without redressive action, i.e. no "softening" of the message, or with redressive action, i.e. with the use of expressions addressing positive politeness or negative politeness. Redressive action means referring to aspects of negative or positive face, e.g. prefixing one's request with "I don't want to impose" means addressing the addressee's negative face, while "we have been friends for so many years" will prepare the ground for an FTA by addressing the positive face.

In recent years there has been much research into politeness across different cultures and there emerged new models of politeness research, e.g. Leech's (1983; 2014) maxims of politeness. A new fast developing area is interdisciplinary research on impoliteness (e.g. Culpeper 2011).

3. Pragmatic interfaces

With its focus on language use in a social context pragmatics is naturally interdisciplinary and cross-disciplinary. It integrates linguists with sociologists, philosophers, psychologists, neuroscientists, computational scientists,

media scientists, business researchers, anthropologists, to mention but a few fields. It also integrates theoretical and applied perspectives (cf. Haugh, Kádár, Terkourafi 2021).

Next to the sub-fields discussed above, fundamental issues in pragmatics include: conventionalisation, pragmatic genres and activity types, commitment and accountability, inference, diachronic analysis, social groups, relationships, and relational networks, such as, e.g., communities of practice. Pragmatics also embraces the problems related to analysing and performing identity, the interface of emotion and linguistic performance, humour, meaningful silence. This wide array of interests results in the emancipation of varied pragmatic subfields, *inter alia*: computational pragmatics, cross-cultural pragmatics, the pragmatics of translation, emancipatory pragmatics, historical (socio)pragmatics, cognitive pragmatics, political pragmatics, etc.

There are pragmatic sub-fields, such as **relevance theory** (**RT**) (Sperber, Wilson 1986/1995) that claim to be theories of all communication, not only linguistic communication. RT (mentioned above in section 2.2) is a post-Gricean cognitive pragmatic model which suggests "relevance" (understood in a metalinguistic way) as the main notion important for understanding communication. RT, accepting Gricean claim that communication is ostensive, focuses on the Recipient/Addressee of the message and claims that human cognition is naturally geared towards achieving maximal relevance in a communicative context. Relevance is understood as a function of **cognitive effect** and **processing effort**, where people are naturally predisposed to try and maximise the cognitive effect while reducing their processing effort. In simple words, people are predisposed to respond to stimuli they are exposed to; they try to make sense of them, but there is also a natural tendency not to spend too much energy on processing of such data. Once people find a "relevant" interpretation, they stop searching for other meanings.

There are many contexts in which pragmatic analysis proves particularly relevant. Its apparatus can be successfully applied in analysing professional varieties, various **LSPs** (**Languages for Specific Purposes**), such as legal language, medical language, academic discourse, etc. Pragmatic apparatus provides tools for showing the actional dimension of language, specific pairing of forms and functions, i.e. the form of speech acts, their

situated specific values. In many contexts pragmatics allows to demonstrate diachronic developments of specific forms, for instance changes that appear in time in conventions in legal, political, or mediated discourses (cf. Fetzer, Witczak-Plisiecka 2021). In a diachronic perspective, pragmatic analysis can expose "the new normal", novel conventions in public discourses.

Linguistic pragmatics may seem to be an extremely wide and diverse field, but it offers space and tools for systematic analysis of phenomena that could appear accidental and elusive. At the same time it concentrates on the fascinating dimension of language seen as a tool to shape the world. Pragmatics sees linguistic patterns of behaviour as actional, not simply referential or descriptive, and linguistic performance as conduct rather than representation.

More detailed information can be found in:

Haugh M., Kádár D., Terkourafi M. (eds.), (2021), *The Cambridge Handbook of Sociopragmatics* [Cambridge Handbooks in Language and Linguistics], Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108954105

Huang Y. (2014), *Pragmatics*, 2nd ed., Oxford: Oxford University Press.

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Study questions

1. What is the scope of pragmatics? Explain the main areas of sociopragmatic studies.
2. What are speech acts? How can we explain the function of utterances?
3. What kind of suggested meaning can be accounted for in pragmatics?
4. Which strategy: positive or negative politeness is being exploited in the examples below:
   a) I don't want to tell you what to do, decide yourself.
   b) We have been friends for so long, why not do it now?
   c) I don't want to impose, but I would love going there.
5. Identify and classify the deictic expressions in the following pieces of language:
   a) We read the book two years ago.
   b) Don't go there all alone. Take him with you.
   c) The explanation comes in the previous chapter and the appendix therein.
6. What are the possible pragmatic aspects of professional discourses?

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